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Steinberg: Student Suspension and Expulsion Proceedings in Tax Supported Ins

STUDENT SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION PROCEEDINGS
IN TAX SUPPORTED INSTITUTIONS:
WHAT PROCESS IS DUE?
MARC I. STEINBERG*

The procedural due process fights which students attending tax
supported institutions enjoy in suspension and expulsion disciplinary
proceedings is a subject of rapidly increasing interest. Before discussing these rights, however, it is first necessary to define the term
"procedural due process."' In examining this concept, courts have concluded that it cannot be defined precisely but must be viewed in terms
of what is just and reasonable, considering all relevant circumstances. 2
Thus procedural due process has been defined in the following terms:
'Due process' is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual contexts. . .. Therefore, as a generalization, it can be said that due
process embodies the differing rules of fair play, which through the
years, have become associated with different types of proceedings.
Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right obtain
in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The
nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding,
and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all considerations
which must be taken into account.8
* A.B., University of Michigan; J.D., University of California at Los Angeles.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV states in relevant part that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Within the context of the
fourteenth amendment, tax supported institutional (e.g. public school) action is considered state action. As stated by the court in Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D.
Wis.), afI'd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970):
[lit must not be forgotten, however small the community, however familiar to one
another the characters in the drama, that when a school board undertakes to expel
a public school student, it is undertaking to apply the terrible organized force of the
state just as surely as it is applied by the police, the courts, the prison warden or the
militia.
Id. at 707.
2. Sims v. Board of Educ., 329 F. Supp. 678, 683 (D.N.M. 1971); Whitfield v.
Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889, 894 (E.D. Ill. 1970); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F.
Supp. 396, 403 (N.D. Fla. 1963); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L.
REV. 1027, 1060 (1969).
3. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960); see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (concurring opinion). See generally
K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATrvE LAw TRFATISE § 7.02 (1958). In determining whether due
process requires a prior hearing, Professor Davis has stated:
The true principle is that a party who has a sufficient interest or right at stake in a
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Hence, the relevant question here is whether students attending tax
supported institutions have procedural due process rights which are

abridged if those students are suspended or expelled without being accorded these procedural rights.

The answer to this question generally

differs in relation to the severity of the action taken by the school.
Thus, students are entitled to greater procedural rights when they are

subject to expulsion than when short suspensions are at issue.
This article will examine the different procedural safeguards which
students enjoy in connection with the various disciplinary measures imposed by public school authorities. First, the procedural due process
rights which students have when they are subject to suspensions of up

to 10 days will be discussed, followed by an examination of the issue of
longer suspensions lasting from 10 days to three months. Finally, the
procedural due process rights which students enjoy when they are sub-

ject to suspensions longer than three months and expulsions will be
discussed.
SUSPENSIONS OF UP TO TEN DAYS

Until very recently, several courts had concluded that the imposition
of brief suspensions without a hearing did not deprive the affected students of due process of law. 4 For instance, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Due Process
clause was inapplicable to a seven day suspension in Linwood v. Board
of Education.' And in Dunn v. Tyler,6 the Fifth Circuit decided that
7
three day suspensions did not abridge the Clause. Goss v. Lopez,
decided by the Supreme Court in January of this year, confronted this
determination of governmental action should be entitled to an opportunity to know
and to meet, with the weapons of rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, and argument, unfavorable evidence of adjudicative facts except in the rare circumstances
when with some other interest, such as national security, justifies an overriding of
the interest in fair hearing.
id. at 115.
4. See, e.g., Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 472 F.2d 438, 443
(5th Cir. 1973); Hatter v. Los Angeles City High School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 1309, 1312
(C.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 452 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1971); Baker v.
Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517, 523 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
5. 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972). In holding that due
process was inapplicable to a seven day suspension, the Seventh Circuit concluded: "We
are of the view that a suspension for so relatively a short period for reasonably
proscribed conduct is a minor disciplinary penalty which the legislature may elect to
treat differently from expulsion or prolonged suspension without violating a constitutional right of the student." Id. at 768-69.
6. 460 F.2d 137, 146 (5th Cir. 1972).
7, -U.S.-, 95 S. Ct. 729, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975).
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very issue and held that procedural due process applies to suspensions
of 10 days or less. The Supreme Court's decision thus guarantees to
every student attending a public institution certain minimal safeguards
when he is subject to such disciplinary measures by school authorities.
In arguing that the Due Process Clause did not apply to short suspensions, school boards had asserted that the finances and efficiency
of the schools would be strained and that the process would result in
a disruption of the academic atmosphere. 8 The Supreme Court rejected these contentions in Goss, the majority observing that these
"young people do not 'shed their constitutional rights' at the schoolhouse door." Hence, in possessing the authority to prescribe and enforce guidelines of conduct in its schools, the state must exercise this
power consistent with constitutional principles. 10
In defining the constitutional safeguards to which the public schools
must adhere, the Court observed that having extended access to education to individuals of appellees' class generally, the state may not withdraw that entitlement on grounds of misconduct without assuring
fundamentally fair procedures to assess whether the misconduct
actually occurred. In advancing this principle, the Court recognized
a protected "property interest" in public education, which "may not be
taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures required by" the Due Process Clause."
Due process prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of liberty. This concept demands that the minimal requirements of the Due Process Clause
must be fulfilled if the government injures an individual's good name,
reputation, honor or integrity.' 2 In the case at hand, the Court noted
that school authorities suspended students from school for periods of 10
8. Note, Nichols v. Eckert: Due Process Rights of Non-Tenured Teachers to PreTermination Hearings,4 UCLA-ALAsKA L. REv. 180, 194 (1974).
9. Goss v. Lopez, -U.S. -, -, 95 S.Ct. 729, 736, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725, 734 (1975).
In Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), quoted with
approval in Goss, the Court stated:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School
officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school as
well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves, must respect their obligations to the State.
Id. at 511.
10. Goss v. Lopez, - U.S. -, -, 95 S.Ct. 729, 736, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725, 734 (1975).
11. Id. at -, 95 S.Ct. at 736, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 735. The Court recognized that
although the state has broad authority to operate its schools, this authority must be
exercised in such a manner so as to not abridge the constitutional rights of its students.
12. Id. at -, 95 S.Ct. at 736, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 735; Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 573 (1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
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days or less because of alleged misconduct. In being subjected to such
penalties, the student has an important liberty interest-reputationat stake.' 8 Thus, the Court concluded that a student in a tax supported
institution has a liberty interest in reputation as well as a property interest in public education. Both of these interests demand that school
authorities comply with the minimum safeguards of due process before
suspending a student for any duration of time whatsoever. 4
Upon determining that due process applies to suspensions of 10 days
or less, the Court next considered "what process is due."'15 Although
due process is a flexible concept, the Court noted that certain minimal
procedures are required. Generally, these procedures mandate that
the student facing suspension "must be given some kind of notice and
afforded some kind of hearing.""' In arriving at this conclusion, the
majority reasoned that the student's interest is to have an opportunity
to explain his version of the case so that he is not mistakenly or unfairly
excluded from the educational institution, with all of its damaging consequences. Because school authorities do commit errors in imposing
disciplinary measures and because this possibility of error is not at all
remote, the Court concluded:
[D]ue process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days
or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the
charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the
evidence the authorities
have and an opportunity to present his
7
side of the story.'
The Court noted that, generally, "[t]here need be no delay between
13. Goss v. Lopez, - U.S. -, -, 95 S. Ct. 729, 736, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725, 735 (1975),
where the Court recognized this interest by asserting:
If sustained and recorded, those charges could seriously damage the students' standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employment. It is apparent that the claimed right
of the State to determine unilaterally and without process whether that misconduct
has occurred immediately collides with the requirements of the Constitution.
Id. at -, 95 S. Ct. at 736, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 735.
14. Id. at -, 95 S.Ct. at 736, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 734-35.
15. Id. at -, 95 S. Ct. at 738, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 737; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471,481 (1972).
16. Goss v. Lopez, - U.S. -, -, 95 S. Ct. 729, 738, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725, 737 (1975)
(emphasis original). This notice may be oral or written. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court relied upon the language in Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. [1 Wall.] 223 (1863): "Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may
enjoy that right they must first be notified." Id. at 233.
17. Goss v. Lopez, - U.S. -, -, 95 S. Ct. 729, 740, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725, 739 (1975).
As stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951): "No better instrument has been devised for arriving at
truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and
opportunity to meet it." Id. at 171-72.
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the time 'notice' is given and the time of the hearing."18 Because of
this fact, notice to the student and the subsequent hearing should normally be conducted prior to the removal of the pupil from school.
There may exist circumstances, however, such as a student who poses
a dangerous threat to persons or property or a substantial threat to disrupt the educational process, where the hearing should be held as soon
as practicable after the student is removed from school. 19
In determining what additional rights a student should have in such
a suspension proceeding, the Court held that the Due Process Clause
does not generally require that the student be afforded the presence
of legal counsel, nor the opportunity to confront, cross-examine, or call
witnesses. 20 The Court did state, however, that the disciplinarian is
free to provide the student access to these safeguards if the complexity
of the case demands it. In adopting this approach, the Court addressed
itself solely to the short suspension of 10 days or less. In unusual circumstances, more than these rudimentary procedures may be necessary, even though only a short suspension is at issue. Furthermore,
the Court concluded that for "[]onger suspensions or expulsions for
the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more
12 1
formal procedures.
The Supreme Court's holding in Goss assures students attending tax
supported institutions of certain procedural due process rights before
school authorities may suspend them, even if that suspension is only
for one day. The issue arises as to what additional safeguards students
enjoy if they are subject to longer suspensions or expulsions. The Supreme Court has not yet confronted this question, but several lower
courts have had to deal with this issue.
LONGER SUSPENSIONS

Before the Supreme Court's holding in Goss, there was some author18. Goss v. Lopez, -

U.S. -,

-,

95 S. Ct. 729, 740, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725, 739 (1975).

19. Id. at -, 95 S. Ct. at 740, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 739; see Wright, The Constitution on
the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027 (1969). Where there is violence and rioting on the
campus, Professor Wright observes that the conditions for holding disciplinary proceedings would be far from ideal. In such a situation, he believes that "there must be power
in a university, when circumstances compel it, to suspend students summarily pending a
later hearing at which they will be given all of the ordinary procedural protections." Id.
at 1074.
20. Goss v. Lopez, -

U.S.

-,

-,

95 S. Ct. 729, 740, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725, 740 (1975).

In ordinary circumstances, the Court believed that the utilization of these formal
procedures would greatly hamper the effectiveness of the educational process.
21. Id. at -, 95 S.Ct. at 741, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 740.
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ity that students did not have due process safeguards in regard to
suspensions of 10 days to three months duration. One federal district
court held that the Due Process Clause was inapplicable to suspensions
of 25 days.22 In light of Goss, however, it is clear that students subject to suspensions which are longer than 10 days enjoy, at a minimum,
those procedural safeguards enumerated in that decision.
The question must be asked whether students subject to these longer
suspensions have greater rights than those provided for in Goss. The
answer largely depends upon the severity of the suspension. Generally, the longer the duration of the suspension, the more likely that a
court will provide a student with the same safeguards as those guaranteed for students who are subject to expulsion. The closer a suspension
is to the 10 days suspension, on the other hand, the more probable that
a court will provide the student with only the Goss minimal standards.
Applying the above principles to relevant cases, in a case where students were suspended from February until May without being accorded
any due process rights, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the nature of the injury required that the students should have been accorded the same procedural due process
rights as those provided for students subject to expulsion.2 s Similarly,
in Williams v. Dade County School Board,24 the same court held that
students faced with 30 to 40 day suspensions should have access to
those procedural guarantees available in expulsion hearings. A federal
district court, in Givens v. Poe,25 concluded that expulsion-like procedural safeguards must be afforded to students who are subject to "suspension for any considerable period of time."2" On the other hand,
in regard to a 10 day suspension, a federal district court held that most,
but not all, of the guarantees provided for in expulsion proceedings
apply as well to suspensions of 10 days. 27 In North Fort Myers JuniorSenior High School v. Williams,28 the Fifth Circuit held that due process
22. Hernandez v. School Dist. No. 1, 315 F. Supp. 289, 293-94 (D. Colo. 1970).

23. Pervis v. La Marque Ind. School Dist., 466 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir. 1972); see
Sullivan v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1032 (1973).
24. 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971). 'To deprive even a high school student, 'in
these days,' of 40 school days may indeed cause serious harm." Id. at 302.
25. 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C. 1972).

26. Id. at 209.
27. Banks v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 292 (S.D. Fla. 1970),
vacated and remanded, 401 U.S. 988 (1971). In particular, the district judge held that
due process did not require the proceeding to be held prior to the suspension.
28. 470 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972).
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applies to 10 day suspensions but stated: "When the punishment to
be imposed is minimal, full compliance with the requisites outlined in
[expulsion proceedings] is not required."2 9 Although there are few
cases on point, it may be fairly concluded that as the length of the suspension approaches the 10 day limit with which the Supreme Court
dealt in Goss, the lower courts will likely provide the student with only
the Goss safeguards. Where the suspension exceeds 30 days, however,
then the courts will probably secure for the student the same procedural
guarantees which are provided for students who are faced with expulsion.
PROLONGED SUSPENSIONS AND EXPULSIONS

Until approximately 15 years ago, students who were subject to prolonged suspensions-those longer than three months--or expulsions
did not enjoy any due process rights.80 Commenting on this situation
in 1957, Professor Seavey observed:
[O]ur sense of justice should be outraged by denial to students of
the normal safeguards. It is shocking that the officials of a state
educational institution, which can function properly only if our
freedoms are preserved, should not understand the elementary
principles of fair play. It is equally shocking to find that a court
supports them in denying to a student the protection given to a
pickpocket."'
Four years later, in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 2 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized that
"due process requires notice and some opportunity for hearing before
a student at a tax-supported college is expelled for misconduct. ' 3a The
court further held that the student must be supplied with the names
of hostile witnesses and an oral or written report as to their testimony.
He should also have the opportunity to present to the hearing authori29. Id. at 958, quoting Pervis v. La Marque Ind. School Dist., 466 F.2d 1054, 1058
(5th Cir. 1972).
30. See W. O'HARA & J. HILL, THE STUDENT/THE COLLEGE/THE LAw 120-21
(1972). The authors summarize the traditional approach in the following terms:
The earliest views of education in America regarded attendance at a college or university, be it public or private, as a privilege that could be denied or revoked by the
institution. Being a privilege, the due process provisions of the Constitution of the
United States were not applicable, and dismissal could occur largely at the discretion of the institution.
Id. at 120-21.
31. Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process", 70 HARV. L. Rlv. 1406, 1406-07
(1957).
32. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
33. Id. at 158.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 7 [2022], No. 2, Art. 2

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:319

ties his own defense which may include oral testimony or written affidavits of witnesses. In establishing these guidelines, the court pointed
out that its decision "is not to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing,
with the right to cross-examine witnesses, is required. '34 Rather, a
hearing at which an impartial tribunal has the opportunity to listen to
both sides in considerable detail fulfills the requirements of due process
of law.
The Dixon decision has been accepted throughout the federal courts
as establishing minimal standards for prolonged suspension and expulsion procedings. Numerous courts, while adhering to the Dixon procedures, have elaborated upon them. In an en banc proceeding, the
United States District Judges for the Western District of Missouri concluded that three minimal due process requirements apply in cases involving prolonged suspensions or expulsions: notice to the student of
the pending charges, a fair hearing, and disciplinary action based only
on grounds supported by substantial evidence.3 5 In promulgating these
guidelines, the judges also indicated that under normal circumstances
procedural due process does not require that the student be entitled
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, to secure legal counsel, to be afforded a public hearing, to have warnings about privileges,
or to enjoy any other protective measure. The court did leave open
the possibility, however, that in an exceptional case due process may
require the use of one or more of these devices.3 "
Similarly, Esteban v. Central Missouri State College17 held that in
regard to expulsion proceedings, "procedural due process must be afforded

. . .

by way of adequate notice, definite charge, and a hearing

with opportunity to present one's own side of the case and with all
necessary protective measures. 38

Schools,"9

In Vought v. Van Buren Public

the district judge held an expulsion hearing must be "conducted in accordance with the guidelines laid down in Dixon."40 These

34. Id. at 159. In electing not to compel the school to furnish a full-dress adversary
proceeding the Fifth Circuit contended that "[sluch a hearing, with the attending
publicity and disturbance of college activities, might be detrimental to the college's
educational atmosphere and impractical to carry out." Id. at 159.
35. General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of
Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133,
147 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (en banc).
36. Id. at 147-48.
37. 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1971).
38. Id. at 1089.
39. 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
40. Id. at 1393. There have been other decisions adhering to the Dixon standards in
prolonged school suspension or expulsion proceedings: Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d
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decisions thus represent the general view that Dixon procedures are the
minimal guidelines required by the Due Process Clause.
Although a majority of courts have held that under normal circumstances a student in a prolonged suspension or expulsion proceeding
does not have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses or to
secure legal representation, there is a rapidly growing minority of courts
which have held otherwise. Probably the most influential of these decisions is Black Coalition v. Portland School District No. 1,41 decided
in 1973 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
holding that procedural due process requires that students subject to
prolonged suspensions or expulsions must be provided "a hearing at
which the student could be represented by counsel and, through counsel, present witnesses on his own behalf, and cross-examine adverse witnesses." 42 These decisions thus represent the growing viewpoint that
due process requires, in addition to the Dixon procedures, the right for
students to employ legal representation and to confront and crossexamine the witnesses against them.
Reflections On the Goss and Dixon Standards
In Goss v. Lopez,4 8 the United States Supreme Court established certain procedures to which school authorities must adhere before suspending a student for up to 10 days. In promulgating these standards,
the Court held that, under normal circumstances, due process does not
require that students be afforded the opportunity to secure legal
44
representation nor to confront, cross-examine, or call witnesses.
Hence, the question must be asked whether students should be provided these safeguards in short suspension proceedings.
In determining whether students should be afforded these guarantees,
the school boards' interests must also be considered. By providing students fullscale hearings, it is argued that such a procedure would im201, 211 (2d Cir. 1972); De Jesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70, 74 (D. Conn. 1972);
Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889, 894 (E.D. Il1. 1970); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295

F. Supp. 978, 990 (W.D. Wis. 1968), a/I'd, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
41.

484 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1973); accord, Fielder v. Board of Educ., 346 F. Supp.

722, 730 (D. Neb. 1972) (cross-examination required in expulsion proceedings); Givens
v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (right to counsel and confrontation of
witnesses); see Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (W.D.
Mo. 1967), af'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
42. Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1973).
43.

-

U.S. -,

44. Id. at -,

95 S. Ct. 729, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975).

95 S. Ct. at 740, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 740.
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pose great burdens upon the finances and efficiency of the schools and
would cause disruption of the academic atmosphere. 5 In relation to
short suspension proceedings, these arguments appear to have merit. The
dissenters in Goss pointed out that studies have indicated approximately
10 per cent of the junior and senior high school pupils sampled were
suspended at least once during a given academic year.4" To provide
these large numbers of students with elaborate hearings would leave
school authorities with "time to do little else."4 7 Writing for the minority,
Mr. Justice Powell recognized this fact:
Suspensions are one of the traditional means . . . used to maintain discipline in the school. It is common knowledge that maintaining order and discipline decorum in school buildings and
classrooms is a major educational problem, and one which has
increased significantly in magnitude in recent years. 48
The majority also recognized the severity of the discipline problem
throughout the schools: "Brief disciplinary suspensions are almost
countless."4 9 In view of the increasing use of this disciplinary measure,
Mr. Justice White concluded that the employment of formalized procedures would greatly hinder the efficiency of the educational process.50
The Court's reasoning in Goss is certainly persuasive. In viewing
procedural due process, "[t]he touchstones in this area are fairness and
reasonableness."'" By securing the student a hearing at which he may
present his side of the story, the Court has fulfilled these requirements.
At the same time, it has not burdened the efficiency and finances of
the schools. 2
45. See Note, Nichols v. Eckert: Due Process Rights of Non-Tenured Teachers to
Pre-TerminationHearings, 4 UCLA-ALAsKA L. REV. 180, 194 (1974).
46. Goss v. Lopez, - U.S. -, -, 95 S. Ct. 729, 745 n.10, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725, 745
n.10 (1975) (dissenting opinion).
47. Id. at -, 95 S. Ct. at 745, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 745.

48. Id. at

-,

95 S. Ct. at 745, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 745.

49.

-,

95 S. Ct. at 740, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 740.

Id. at

50. Mr. Justice White further stated:
To impose in each such case even truncated trial type procedures might well over-

whelm administrative facilities in many places and, by diverting resources, cost more
than it would save in educational effectiveness. Moreover, further formalizing the

suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only
make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as
part of the teaching process.

Id at -, 95 S.Ct. at 740-41; 42 L. Ed. 2d at 740.
51. Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889, 894 (E.D. Ill. 1970); see Due v. Florida
A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 403 (N.D. Fla. 1963); Wright, The Constitution on
the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1060 (1969).
52. See Goss v. Lopez, - U.S. -, -, 95 S. Ct. 729, 740, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725, 740
(1975), where the Court observed: "[W]e have imposed requirements which are, if

anything, less than a fair-minded school principal would impose upon himself in order to
avoid unfair suspensions."
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It is submitted, however, that an entirely different approach should
be adhered to when prolonged suspension or expulsion hearings are
at issue. At these proceedings, public school students should be provided the safeguards of securing legal representation and of confronting
and cross-examining adverse witnesses. Contrary to the brief suspension, the prolonged suspension or expulsion occurs much more
infrequently and, as recognized by Mr. Justice Powell, "is an incompar-

ably more serious matter than the brief suspension. ....
High school students, as well as collegiates, suffer grievous injury if

they are subjected to prolonged suspensions or expulsions. Courts
have taken "judicial notice of the social, economic and psychological
value and importance today of receiving a public education through
twelfth grade. ' '54 The possible consequence of such disciplinary action
is that the student may decide not to pursue his education.5" If he does
continue, he may feel deep resentment and hostility against the educational system. In any event, the student may not receive the value from
his education he would have otherwise received. The possible result
of the prolonged suspension or expulsion experience is that the student
will not acquire the amount of education which he needs to achieve
his career goals. 5 6
53. Id. at -, 95 S. Ct. at 742 n.2, 42 L. Ed. at 741 n.2 (dissenting opinion); see
Fielder v. Board of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 720, 722 (D. Neb. 1972), where the district
judge recognized that the "[d]eprival of a student of a right to education is a solemn act,
pregnant with painful consequences." Fielder v. Board of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 720,
722 (D. Neb. 1972). The district judge's observation is consistent with the Supreme
Court's approach in its landmark decision, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), in which the Court concluded:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments....
[I]t is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Id. at 493. The seriousness of this disciplinary measure was recognized by the Dixon
court:
It is most unlikely that a public college would accept a student expelled from another
public college of the same state. Indeed, expulsion may well prejudice the student
in completing his education at any other institution. Surely no one can question
that the right to remain at the college in which the plaintiffs were students in good
standing is an interest of extremely great value.
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961).
54. Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 208 (W.D.N.C. 1972), quoting Breen v. Kahl,
296 F. Supp. 702, 704 (W.D. Wis.), affd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 937 (1970).
55. Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 208 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
56. As stated by the Dixon court, without sufficient education, the student will "not
be able to earn an adequate living, to enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely
as possible the duties and responsibilities of good citizens." Dixon v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). See also
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By being subjected to such an irreparable injury, it is difficult to perceive how the school's interest can be considered paramount to that of
the student's. The financial costs and the possibility of disruption in
the efficiency of the educational process are minimal when compared
to a student's entitlement to public education. The imposition of

severe disciplinary measures could very well signify the termination of
that pupil's education and his hopes for a better life. For the school,
the disruption rationale is, at most, a speculative theory. It would be
the highly unusual case where disruption of the educational process
would be caused by affording the student these extra safeguards.

Furthermore, prolonged suspension or expulsion hearings are not
everyday affairs.

They are relatively rare, especially in relation to the

large number of brief suspensions imposed by school authorities.57
The procedural guarantees which students seek are basic to the assurance that fundamental fairness will be accorded in these severe
disciplinary proceedings. The potential benefits of counsel are indisputable. To the confused, apprehensive student facing expulsion,
presence of counsel will enable him to confront the charges with greater
confidence that the hearing authorities will believe him. It must be

remembered that the student, although perhaps an adult by legal standards, is inexperienced in these matters.

He is possibly faced with a

penalty which can ruin his future, ostracize him from certain groups,

and cause great embarrassment to his family and friends. 58 Confronted
with such a traumatic experience, it is no small wonder that the student
may be afraid and unsure of himself. In such a situation, presence of
counsel is necessary for the student to have a fair hearing. At the very
least, the burden should be placed upon school authorities to show that
the student was not prejudiced by the absence of counsel.5
Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 208 (W.D.N.C. 1972). In Vought v. Van Buren
Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969), the district judge noted that "a record of
expulsion from high school constitutes a lifetime stigma." Id. at 1393.
57. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, - U.S.-, -, 95 S. Ct. 729, 745 n.10, 42 L. Ed. 725, 745
n.10 (1975) (dissenting opnion).
58. See Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 577 (1971).
59. As stated by one commentator:
[D]enial of the right to be represented by retained counsel produces an unconstitutionally unfair hearing unless the school comes forward with an affirmative showing
that serious adverse consequences would result from counsel's participation or that
the potential advantages of legal representation were clearly supplied through other
procedural safeguards.
Id. at 612; see Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv, 1027
(1969), where the author states:
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The purpose of the prolonged suspension or expulsion hearing is to
ascertain the truth. According to Dean Wigmore, the use of crossexamination "is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."60 In minor disciplinary actions, the
expenditure of time and finances, the possible negative consequence

of eliminating sources of information, and the potential for destroying
in-school relationships may very well outweigh the benefits of crossexamination. 6 '

But when a student's reputation and career are at

stake, as they clearly are in severe disciplinary proceedings, then fundamental fairness and reasonableness demand that the student be provided the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers. When the
accuser lacks direct knowledge or feels hostility toward the student, the
need for cross-examination is imperative. Unfortunately, this lack of

personal knowledge or sentiment of hostility may only become known
upon cross-examination. Furthermore, much of the ability of this technique "lies in its capacity to expose latent truth unknown by all until
it surfaces. ' 62 Thus, it is submitted that the disadvantages to the school
board by allowing cross-examination in severe disciplinary proceedings

are far outweighed by both the interests of the student and society in
securing a fair hearing. When such important elements as reputation
and property interests are at issue, fairness should require that the
student be afforded the fundamental safeguard of due process. 63
If 'fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short, the essentials of due process' require, as has recently been held, both the right to counsel and, where it is needed,
to appointed counsel in proceedings for determination of juvenile delinquency, I
do not see why they do not require recognition of similar rights in major disciplinary
proceedings.
Id. at 1075.
60. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 29 (3d ed. 1940); see Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 428 (1969); Willner v.
Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-104 (1963). In Goldberg, the
Court observed: "In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of
fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970).
61. See generally Buss, Procedural Due Processfor School Discipline: Probing the
Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 545, 603 (1971).
62. Id. at 603.
63. See Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students in W. O'HA.RA & J.
HILL, THE STUDENT/THE COLLEGE/THE LAW 209 (1972). This statement, which enumerates the rights and freedoms of students, has been endorsed by such organizations as
the American Association of University Professors, United States National Student
Association, Association of American Colleges, American Association for Higher Education and the American College Personnel Association. The statement provides that the
student should have the right "to be assisted in his defense by an adviser of his choice
• . . and should have an opportunity to hear and question adverse witnesses." Id. at
217.
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CONCLUSION

In Goss v. Lopez, 64 the Supreme Court held that students attending
tax supported institutions have important property and liberty interests
at stake when they are suspended from school, even for only one day.
Because of these interests, students must be afforded minimal procedural due process rights when they are subject to suspensions of up to
10 days. What additional guarantees should be provided when students
are confronted with prolonged suspensions or expulsions, however, are
still unsettled. The Fifth Circuit's holding in Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education"5 has generally been accepted throughout the
country as establishing minimal standards for severe disciplinary proceedings. An increasing minority of courts, while adhering to Dixon,
hold that due process also requires that students be given the opportunity to secure legal representation and to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses against them. Because of the gravity of the charge and
the ensuing consequences if these severe penalties are imposed,
students should be afforded the above safeguards.
64. - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 729, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975).
65. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
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